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The Tsunami in South-East Asia in 2004 prompted the largest military
disaster response in history. Encouraged by the success, increasing atten-
tion has been paid to the various humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief activities conducted by US armed forces. Since 2006, the US Navy
deploys one of its two large hospital ships in annual missions to either
Central and South America or the Asia–Pacific region to provide people
in need with free care. These missions offer many opportunities to
increase the soft power capital of the United States by forging ties with
host nation governments and improving the image of the United States
within the local population. However, this article argues that we need
more research on the impact of humanitarian assistance to justify a con-
tinuation in a fiscally constrained environment.
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What better way to knock down the hatred, the barriers of ethnic and religious
groups that are afraid of America, and hate America, than to offer good medical
policy and good health to these countries? (Thompson 2004)
The newest maritime strategy “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapow-
er” (United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard 2007) lists humanitar-
ian assistance (HA) and disaster relief (DR) among the core competencies of US
maritime forces. While in prior years, these tasks were treated as an “extra,” they
now have been promoted to being equally as important as the four traditional
naval missions of sea control, presence, deterrence, and power projection. The
US military has a long tradition of providing humanitarian aid. During World
War I, for example, President Wilson used food as a form of disaster relief to
counter the spread of Bolshevism and civil unrest (Zajtchuck 2003). A Center
for Naval Analyses (Cobble, Gaffney, and Gorenburg 2005) study on US military
responses to international situations between 1970 and 2003 identified only 22
combat operations compared with 366 HA/DR missions. These numbers clearly
show the importance and frequency of HA and DR, yet little has been written
about the role and experience of military forces in these domains. While the tra-
ditional naval missions advance US interest, the contribution of HA/DR is still
contested and needs to be evaluated. This article aims to contribute to the
important debate regarding the usefulness of military forces in the humanitarian
1I am pleased to acknowledge the help of Lynn Alberding, Robert Axelrod, Ivo Dobrev, Theresa Jackson, Kath-
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arena by exploring the soft power potential of naval humanitarian assistance.
With the unprecedented use of military assets during the Tsunami 2004 relief
efforts, a new level of military involvement had been reached and continues to
affect all future humanitarian operations. The often-cited success of US aid
provided the impetus for more regular, scheduled, proactive humanitarian medi-
cal missions with US naval hospital ships as a platform. The goals of this paper
are twofold. First, it places hospital ship missions in the context of the concept
of soft power. Second, it identifies important areas of research to better under-
stand the benefits of these missions.
Defining the Concepts
Hard Power and Soft Power: Coercion Versus Attraction
The term “soft power” was coined by Joseph Nye in Bound to Lead (1990) who
offers the following definition: “soft power is the ability to affect others through
the cooptive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive
attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes” (Nye 2011). Unlike hard
power, which influences through coercion, soft power exerts a subtle influence.
According to Nye (2004, 2011), the goal is to get others to want what you want
without coercing them. Vuving (2009) suggests instead that getting others to
accept what you want can be enough. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the
United States had pursued a unilateral foreign policy and relied heavily on mili-
tary means to resolve all security problems (Feste 2003; Nye 2011). The preemp-
tion doctrine had removed any distinction between imminent and potential
future threats. It assumed that grave threats were now always imminent. This
thought process led to the devaluation of diplomacy and negotiation and shifted
the emphasis to the use of immediate force, thereby failing to distinguish
between short- and long-term threats and different adversaries. After many years
of neglecting soft power approaches, a policy shift became visible with the
release of the National Security Strategy (NSS) 2010 and the Quadrennial
Defense Report (QDR) 2010. Both strategic documents emphasized the renewed
US interest to invest in soft power. “As a global power, the United States has a
broad range of tools for advancing its national interests (…). Whenever possible,
we seek to pursue those interests through cooperation, diplomacy, economic
development and engagement, and the power of America’s ideas and values”
(QDR 2010).
Nye (2011) argues that while hard power is and will remain important, it is
not sufficient. Power has different aspects and faces (Dahl 1961). The first face2
uses coercion or incentives to reach the desired outcome. The second face con-
trols actions to limit possible choices. The third face—soft power—creates and
shapes beliefs, perceptions, and preferences. Only the first face of power is
directly felt, the two other faces exert a more subtle influence on their target
but are allegedly nevertheless effective. More recently, Nye (2004) defined the
combination of the hard power of coercion and payment with the soft power of
persuasion and attraction as “smart power.” With their capability to exercise both
soft and hard power, naval forces are a unique smart power tool. This is also
reflected in the newest naval strategy (United States Navy, Marine Corps, and
Coast Guard 2007). According to Elleman (2007, quoted in United States Navy
2010), “during the nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries, the very
thought that sea powers might regularly use naval platforms to deliver humani-
tarian aid, as opposed to cutting off and starving an enemy’s supply lines, would
2Incentives can come in the form of payments or inducements. Another form is negative sanctions, for example,
taking away economic assistance previously provided.
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have seemed alien. In the twenty-first century, however, national power and
prestige are more and more characterized by soft power. UNIFIED ASSISTANCE
[after the Tsunami in South-East Asia] showed that hard power assets like
aircraft carriers can also be the best providers of soft power.”
Soft power has also attracted much criticism. Joffe (2006) cautions that soft
power is still a form of power and “does not necessarily increase the world’s love
for America.” And like all forms of power, it can still create enemies. Another
weakness of soft power is that it lies within the people to decide how much
power it will have, and there is little to no control how the actions will be
perceived by the target population. Gray (2011:vi–viii) argues that “an important
inherent weakness of soft power as an instrument of policy is that it utterly
depends upon the uncoerced choices of foreigners. Sometimes their preferences
will be compatible with ours, but scarcely less often they will not be.” In general,
the concepts of attraction and persuasion and their translation into soft power
are difficult to measure. But when trying to convince others to pursue soft power
approaches, it is important to be able to demonstrate their effectiveness.
Peacetime Deployments of Naval Forces
The US Navy (USN) has been the predominant military instrument of diplo-
macy, due largely to its greater mobility and flexibility compared to the other
services (Turner 1974; Till 2009). Army and Air Force are more likely associated
with greater threat and destruction. Naval forces are less intrusive and offer a
more subtle influence. This offers unique opportunities to create soft power.
The diplomatic potential of navies has long been recognized by nations and can
be traced back to the heritage of colonial powers that would dispatch their fleets
to boost their prestige and to influence events ashore (Davidson 2009). While
some argue that the use of coercive diplomacy is a thing of the past, others see
an increasing need in an era in which the focus of the USN is shifting away
from large-scale conflicts (Nailor 1984; Booth 1985; Ghosh 2001; Le Miere
2011).
Naval diplomacy acts as a signal demonstrating US interest and concern in
particular regions and countries. Any naval deployment demonstrates US com-
mitment and capabilities (Sanders 2007). At the lower end of the diplomatic
spectrum are measures such as goodwill visits, exercises, and other confidence-
building activities. At the higher end, armed suasion is the most forceful aspect
of coercive diplomacy (Stocker 1998). Further traditional diplomatic peacetime
activities center on cooperation and exercises, military-to-military contacts, officer
training, and access agreements as means of demonstrating and building positive
relationships. Even daily activities such as “ship visits can be a useful form of
diplomatic exchange, help maintain or secure good relations, and win popular
favour” (Till 2009). All these activities can contribute to US soft power capital.
During port calls, deployed sailors frequently help communities on land. Exam-
ples include volunteer work such as supporting school construction and mainte-
nance, helping to build hospitals, and inviting foreign nationals aboard a US
Navy ship. While such humanitarian assistance activities are the by-product of
routine port calls, humanitarian assistance operations are sometimes deployed
for the sole purpose of delivering assistance. By delivering aid, the United States
can demonstrate goodwill, reassure support, shape perceptions, build relations,
and thus generate soft power. For example, the disaster relief aid delivered in
response to the Tsunami in South-East Asia resulted in a more positive attitude
toward the United States, suggesting a positive effect of this display of soft power
in opposition to the traditional hard power use of military assets. After realizing
the potential of health diplomacy, the United States decided to deploy the hospi-
tal ships USNS Mercy and USNS Comfort in biannual missions to countries of
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interest in the Pacific Commands (PACOM) and Southern Commands (SOUTH-
COM) areas of responsibility (AOR). In addition to “winning hearts and minds,”
these missions serve as a training and relationship building opportunity for US
and foreign forces and engage in capacity building for future disasters. Admiral
Fallon (2007) observed that
Our experience with the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami relief effort revealed the
tremendous influence of DoD-led humanitarian operations in reinforcing a posi-
tive view of the U.S. (…). Since then, we have adjusted our priorities and
resources to achieve those effects through deliberately planned humanitarian
assistance efforts. The paramount event of this type in 2006 was the deployment
of the Navy hospital ship USNS Mercy. During a 5-month period, Mercy con-
ducted ten humanitarian visits among predominantly Muslim populations in
South and Southeast Asia. (…). Events of this type will continue to be central to
our security cooperation in the USPACOM AOR.
These ambitions beyond improving the health of the target population make
humanitarian assistance a tool for politics. This has triggered much criticism and
remains controversial. Before we turn to the question of the soft power potential
of hospital ship missions, we need to understand the differences between disas-
ter relief and humanitarian assistance.
Humanitarian Assistance Versus Disaster Relief
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, although often discussed together,
are two very distinct missions with different political dynamics. While many of
the advantages as well as concerns apply to both operation types, they are nev-
ertheless fundamentally different and pose specific challenges and opportuni-
ties. Humanitarian assistance missions are proactive and largely a reaction to
artificial events, while disaster relief is reactive and mostly called upon after nat-
ural disasters. The latter require immediate reactions to events such as earth-
quakes, flooding, hurricanes, cyclones, tornadoes, tsunamis, fires, volcano
eruptions, landslides, and storms. Even though warning systems are improving,
natural disasters mostly strike with little to no forewarning; thus, these opera-
tions focus on emergency relief and immediate humanitarian help to alleviate
the suffering with only minimal levels of preparedness. Also important is the
environment in which the operations take place. Proactive humanitarian assis-
tance missions are deployed in both permissive and nonpermissive environ-
ments, while disaster response largely occurs in a permissive environment—even
when it was hostile prior to the event such as in Aceh, Indonesia before the
Tsunami.
Civilian agencies, the main actors in humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief, are very critical of the military’s increasing involvement. Their main
argument against military activities in the humanitarian arena stems from their
principles of neutrality and impartiality as armed forces are directed by govern-
ment policy (Chretien 2011). The presence of both civilian and military actors
may blur the lines between the spheres, possibly confusing and endangering
the roles of civilian aid workers. It is argued that the nature, mission, and
experience of civilian agencies make them more capable of providing impartial
aid and adapting to local cultures. Military forces find themselves in an opera-
tional environment and amongst humanitarian actors with whom they are
unfamiliar (Daniel 2006). But often, such as immediately after a natural disas-
ter, civilian agencies lack essential means to deliver aid. Militaries, on the other
hand, are well equipped to function in a setting where infrastructure is
destroyed and their capabilities in the areas of personnel, equipment, logistics,
and expertise can be decisive. Military forces are trained for crisis situations;
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thus, disaster relief is a more compelling military mission because it suggests a
better fit with more traditional activities. Because of the destruction accompa-
nying natural disasters and the necessity of an immediate response, civilian
actors are more likely to accept military support in this capacity and have
praised the US military’s response, noting that no other organization can deli-
ver large-scale logistical capabilities and relief assets so rapidly (Chretien 2011).
More controversial are the increasing humanitarian assistance missions. Under
the umbrella of humanitarian assistance, the Department of Defense has
engaged in various civil–military health activities, many of which would be bet-
ter defined as development work according to civilian agencies (Bonventre,
Hicks, and Okutani 2009). Many NGOs and other civilian actors have called
for DoD to limit its engagements to last resort disaster relief (Almquist 2012;
Interaction 2013).
In 2009, the Joint Chiefs of Staff released a document distinguishing between
two types of military foreign assistance: foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA)
and humanitarian civic assistance (HCA). FHA is tasked to tend to urgent needs
in a host nation triggered by a disaster or catastrophe. HCA is funded under
separate authorities and receives its authorization by Title 10, U.S.C, Section
401. By statute, HCA missions must serve the US and host nation’s security
interests, and the operational readiness skills of the participating armed forces
must be promoted. “Assistance is limited to: (i) Medical, surgical, dental, and
veterinary care provided in areas of a country that are rural or are underserved
by medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary professionals, respectively, including
education, training, and technical assistance related to the care provided. (ii)
Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems. (iii) Well drilling
and construction of basic sanitation facilities. (iv) Rudimentary construction and
repair of public facilities” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2009). Despite this useful distinc-
tion, the general term “humanitarian assistance” is widely used to describe both
types of aid. Understanding the definitions of and differences between humani-
tarian assistance and disaster relief is particularly important when working with
different actors because their classifications are likely to be different. Proactive
hospital ship missions are not initiated by an imminent disaster; thus, the term
“humanitarian civic assistance” better describes these proactive missions.
US Hospital Ships
Today the USN operates two hospital ships. The USNS Comfort and the USNS
Mercy are both converted San Clemente-class supertankers re-fitted into floating
trauma centers. Both vessels are commanded by the US Military Sealift Com-
mand (MSC); one is maintained on each coast (Mercy is stationed in San Diego,
CA, Comfort is stationed in Norfolk, VA) with a small civilian crew and an
embarked core naval medical team. The ships are 894 feet long and when fully
operational have 63 civilians, 956 naval hospital staff, and 258 naval support staff.
Both hospital ships are equipped with a 1,000-bed hospital facility, 12 operating
rooms, and a helicopter deck and side ports to take on patients at sea. This is
important as many ports lack infrastructure for the docking of such large vessels,
and often they have to anchor off coast. Thus, the majority of patients arrive by
helicopter and a smaller number by boat.
The hospital ships’ primary mission is to provide emergency medical support
for US armed forces deployed in combat (Wayne 2008). Their “secondary
mission is to provide full hospital services in support of US disaster relief and
humanitarian missions worldwide” (United States Navy 2008). The USNS Mercy
deploys biannually to the Pacific as part of the mission PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
(2006, 2008, 2010, 2012), the USNS Comfort to the Caribbean Basin and Central
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and South America in mission CONTINUING PROMISE (2007, 2009, 2011).3
Table 1 provides an overview of the USNS Mercy and USNS Comfort humanitar-
ian assistance deployments since 2006.4
US Navy hospital ship missions are organized by SOUTHCOM and PACOM,
respectively, but many different actors are involved in the planning phase and
the mission itself. The country choice is based on a complex decision-making
process and is heavily supported by the US ambassadors to the countries in the
relevant region. The Department of State, and in particular USAID, and the
DoD are working toward better mutual understanding and cooperation to jointly
further US national interests and foreign aid objectives. Since 2011, the Navy
Liaison Officer at USAID helps to facilitate coordination. While cooperation
between all actors needs be improved in the future, the visits are increasingly
characterized as “whole-of government interagency missions” (United States
Department of Defense 2012). In 2012, USAID, the Department of Justice, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Army, Air Force, and the
Marine Corps were all involved in PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP. As part of every
mission, medical staff from foreign countries and an increasing number of
NGOs join the crew. Both the US government and NGOs benefit from this col-
laboration. The hospital ship provides the NGOs with transportation and hous-
ing, and NGOs are often better informed about the needs of the populations, as
well as local customs and traditions, and might even have worked on the ground
before. However, despite this increased collaboration, civilian agencies remain
critical of these missions and the support extends not much beyond the involved
NGOs. Concerns such as the short-term focus and lack of integration with other
HA programs remain.
Once the countries are chosen, so-called Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS)
teams are dispatched. The teams meet with the respective ministries of health
and US embassy personnel to discuss country-specific plans. This includes surgi-
cal capability, main health concerns, special needs, and the extent of possible
aftercare. The missions are not limited to treating patients aboard the ship but
also include activities on shore such as training session and medical and veteri-
nary services in remote locations. A few days before the hospital ship arrives, an
Advanced Coordinating Element (ACE) team finalizes plans in country. The host
countries provide documentation of the patients to be evaluated by the USNS
crew, including a list of surgical patients to simplify the procedure and avoid any
delays (Hartgerink et al. 2010).
While the disaster relief after the Tsunami came in the form of an aircraft
carrier, hospital ships are not warships. They are white hulls with a red cross,
recognized as protected platforms in whatever capacity they serve (Grunawalt
2005). Whereas the use of aircraft carriers for disaster relief shows a hard power
tool in a soft power function, health diplomacy by US Navy hospital ships does
not involve hard power warships. Yet hospital ships convey US military might
and power. A vessel intended to serve US servicemen is operating as a facility for
foreign nationals in need. A Navy capable of maintaining a hospital ship of this
size is no doubt capable of large-scale operations. The size of the ship can both
demonstrate a larger commitment to politicians and trigger admiration by the
patients and observers. This argument also helps to underline the signaling
3As the USNS Comfort and Mercy only deploy biannually, every other year a large-deck amphibious ship, a grey
hull, is sent in their place. However, in this paper, I focus only on the hospital ship missions because of their larger
capacity and visibility.
4Unfortunately, CONTINUING PROMISE 2013 was canceled due to the sequestration. It remains to be seen
whether there are negative consequences by not following through with the promised visits and how HA operations
are valued in future budgeting.
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power these large vessels convey that individual Department of State initiatives
cannot provide.
The Soft Power Potential of Hospital Ship Missions5
Soft Power Currencies
There are different ways to measure the soft power potential of military humani-
tarian assistance. Vuving (2009) suggested replacing the question, “What consti-
tutes soft power?” with “What generates attraction?” thereby focusing on the
attraction component of the definition. He defines three power currencies that
generate attraction and thus soft power: gratitude, admiration, and shared ideals,
values, causes, and visions. The first form of soft power currency is created
through the positive attitude of agents when engaging with the clients. Soft
power is generated by gaining gratitude and sympathy. The second soft power
currency is concerned with the actual work to create soft power, where the client
learns from the success of the agent resulting in the power of admiration. The
third soft power currency is represented by the shared ideals, values, causes, and
visions of the agent. The need for moral support and the tendency to join forces
with those who pursue the same goal are thought to work toward generating this
currency of soft power. Thus, for this currency, the power lies in inspiring the
client. These three elements can be applied to hospital ship visits to better
understand their value to the United States. Figure 1 provides an overview.
The power of benignity can take many forms but mostly lies in “doing good to
others.” The recruiting slogan already presents the US Navy as “A Global Force For
Good.” The mission of hospital ship visits in particular is to do good and offer free
help and care to people in need. Admiral Stavridis (2010), former commander of
the US Southern Command, observed the positive influence US naval forces
exerted in Latin America and the Caribbean and the capability of military humani-
tarian assistance to improve the image of the United States and military forces in
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FIG. 1. Soft Power Currencies
5The United States is not the only country to deploy military hospital ships. China has also recognized the
power of health diplomacy and the soft power potential of humanitarian assistance. The first deployment of the
Chinese hospital ship Peace Ark to the Gulf of Aden underscored the Chinese soft power interests in Africa (Mac-
kenzie 2011). In November 2011, the Peace Ark departed for its most recent deployment, Operation “Harmonious
Mission” to Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Costa Rica in “America’s backyard”(McFadden 2011).
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particular. He found that initiatives to improve health security demonstrate that
the United States cares and is willing to help the people in the region, whereas
counter-narcotics and terrorism activities are largely perceived as focusing on
narrow US interests. As Vuving (2009:9) says, “you also appear benign when you
are more harmless than your condition suggests. (…) when you behave unselfishly
(…) [and] you are putting other people’s interests before your own.” These crite-
ria can be met with hospital ship visits and translate into high levels of gratitude.
Bonventre et al. (2009) conclude that “hospital ships’ visits to Central and South
America have paid dividends not only for the skills of military medics but also in
influencing both populations and government leaders to view the United States
and its military in a more favorable light.” The presence of US NGOs and civilian
actors in addition to the military can possibly help to further enhance the per-
ceived benignity of these missions. Another important factor is the level of global
attention. Hospital ship missions are planned months in advance and are not
“dependent” on natural or artificial disasters and are thus less under the watch of
global community. After a large natural disaster or war, the global community
expects US support and aid. Hospital ship missions, however, while still helping
people in need, seldom make a difference between life and death. Because only
limited attention is paid to these visits, it can be argued that the level of goodwill is
even higher because the United States is less likely to receive any of the benefits
from the positive global recognition generally associated with disaster response.
Yet the population and government may interpret proactive humanitarian assis-
tance as a stronger commitment and sign of goodwill.
Admiration can be triggered by a variety of attributes, among them a strong
military, a wealthy economy, advanced science and technology, or success. The
fact that the United States can deploy large vessels to help people in need dem-
onstrates capability, an important indicator for the potential to elicit admiration.
Similarly, only a wealthy economy can afford to undertake proactive humanitar-
ian assistance. This show of capability and goodwill can generate admiration
which is said to positively translate into imitation and respect. Vuving (2009) also
argues that admiration can help to overcome suspicion and hostility and work
toward cooperation and understanding. Ideally, clients would seek US advice in
other matters and show respect for other US decisions by their support of them.
Of course, it is difficult to determine in practice how this support should mani-
fest itself as there are many different levels and possible venues. Activities can
range from backing of small-scale US diplomatic initiatives in the host country
or region to United Nations voting. Depending on the desired outcome, an
increase in bilateral diplomatic activities may be enough. Imitation is even more
difficult to measure, and certainly respect does not have to translate into support
for US policies.
Shared ideals, values, causes, and visions are very important in international
relations. Striving for a common goal is said to encourage cooperation and
friendship. It builds confidence in moral authority and legitimacy of the agent.
By caring for the health of the host nation’s population, the US and the host
nation government share a common goal. This again can translate into stronger
relations and support for the United States and a more favorable attitude toward
the United States overall. Ideally, cooperation during the mission translates into
cooperation in other matters and shared ideals, values, causes, and visions
encourage understanding and foster trust for future interactions.
Hospital Ship Mission Challenges
Hospital ship missions carry some of the risks described above. As mentioned
earlier, one of the weaknesses of soft power is that it lies within the people to
decide how much power it will have, and there is limited influence on how the
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actions will be perceived by the target population and host government. Because
payoffs are not immediate and are rather manifested in “storing up political
capital” (Nye 2004), it is difficult to attribute favorable outcomes to specific
missions as results may be years away. “Nonetheless,” Nye (2004) argues, “the
indirect effects of attraction and a diffuse influence can make a significant differ-
ence in obtaining favorable outcomes in bargaining situations. Otherwise leaders
would insist only on immediate payoffs and specific reciprocity, and we know
that is not always the way they behave.” The United States, Nye says (2004), effec-
tively used soft power after the Second World War to form alliances and institu-
tions with common goals. Gratitude, admiration, and shared ideals, values,
causes, and visions all helped to forge these coalitions. These developments take
time, and similarly it might take time before hospital ship missions translate into
soft power. Conversely, however, it is also possible that host nations reciprocate
favors immediately after the visit rather than storing up political capital resulting
in only short-term influence.
The problem of perception is very relevant to humanitarian assistance. While
hospital ship missions offer many opportunities to attract and persuade, the
potential negative effects should not be overlooked. Problems include the
limited time spent in each country,6 the resulting restricted number of patients
receiving treatment, and unavailability of necessary follow-up care, which, in the
worst case, may cause even bigger health problems than before. Ritchie and Mott
(2003) note: “The attempts to gain the hearts and minds [through humanitarian
aid] may also backfire. If Americans are perceived as treating only one clan, the
other may be angry.” Additionally, unrealistic expectations can trigger dissatisfac-
tion with US efforts and consequently negatively affect public opinion. Further-
more, the population could be frustrated that the United States might not come
back to the same place, and after a few days of top-level care, they have to rely
on the local capacities again. Such considerations might turn the gained trust
into anger. From a government’s perspective, problems can arise when the popu-
lation becomes dissatisfied with the current health services prompted by the
high-level care during the hospital ship visits. For example, while Bonventre
et al. (2009:18) found positive effects of the deployments to Central and South
America, they also observed that “the Mercy’s visit to Indonesia was more prob-
lematic, because the standard of care delivered far exceeded what the Indone-
sian government was able to provide after the ship departed, and Indonesia
claimed that this had undermined its legitimacy and authority.” Similarly an arti-
cle in the Tico Times (Williams 2011) from Costa Rica described how many
patients had voiced complaints about inattentive national hospitals. While they
often have to wait for years to get appointments at the local hospital, one woman
is cited saying “The gringos come here and give me a check-up in 2 days.” Such
considerations might reverse the positive effect of gratitude from a government’s
perspective.
As it is argued that soft power currencies take time to develop and even more
time to translate into power, one single hospital ship visit is not likely to trigger
host nation support for US policies or long-lasting positive attitudes toward the
United States in the host population. Gratitude and admiration for example can
still be felt but may fade after a few weeks. It may thus be important to provide a
certain continuity of aid and consider a return of the hospital ship during the
6This issue was addressed in the 2012 PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP mission. Unlike in earlier years, the vessel spent
almost two weeks in every port. Thus, instead of visiting as many countries as possible, the focus lay on extending
each stay for as long as possible (see PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 2012: http://www.cpf.navy.mil/pacific-partnership/
2012/).
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next deployment. Wilder (2010) finds that the level of US aid to Pakistan was
dependent on the current importance the United States attached to the country
as a strategic ally, in what he calls a “front-line state” or “forgotten state.” US
“aid programmes have much more to do with buying or renting influence, espe-
cially with the Pakistan military, and promoting US security interests, rather than
helping Pakistanis.” While his study analyzes assistance in a much broader frame-
work, this problem nonetheless translates to hospital ship visits if countries are
not revisited in subsequent years. If, however, the United States wants more
immediate payoffs, continuity is not as important and “renting” current influ-
ence can be sufficient.
Up to now, the United States largely has relied on measuring efforts rather
than effectiveness to evaluate hospital ship missions. Success is measured by
counting the numbers of surgeries or treated patients. While these numbers
are certainly important, they fail to capture the bigger picture about enduring
impacts and how these missions can increase US soft power and support
national security objectives. Thus, if one wants to answer the question whether
in a fiscally constrained environment, military humanitarian assistance should
be continued, new measures of effectiveness have to be defined and evalu-
ated.
Measures of Effectiveness
Macro-Level Influence
In the realm of disaster response, disaster diplomacy explores whether natural
disasters encourage cooperation between countries that traditionally have been
enemies. The concept of disaster diplomacy is concerned with strategic and
political outcomes. Possible questions include whether disaster activities trig-
gered diplomatic activities and whether they were long-lived or abated soon after
the disaster (Kelman 2006). Similarly, the questions in regard to hospital ship
missions should be whether, through humanitarian assistance, cooperation is
encouraged beyond the immediate aid activities and how this translates into pos-
sible benefits for the United States and/or humanitarian benefits for the partner
countries. But before we can answer this question, we need to know what the
United States wants to achieve with humanitarian assistance and hospital ship
missions in particular. Only overarching but no clear goals have been stated,
making it even more difficult to create robust measures. Broad goals mentioned
by the DoD and the Navy include building relationships and trust, fostering
goodwill, increasing interoperability for future disasters, demonstrating commit-
ment to a region, to partnership, and to working toward common goals (see for
example Vernon and Kingsley 2011; Miles 2012). Less often mentioned is capac-
ity building to improve the health-care system in the countries visited (see for
example Wojciechowski 2011).
A recent study by the Center for Strategic International Studies (Roughead
et al. 2013) comes to a similar conclusion. The authors recommend “sharpen
[ing] and clarify[ing] the rationale for humanitarian engagement.” The study
evaluates the PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 2012 operation, based on interviews
within the Pacific Command, the Pacific Fleet, US country teams, and foreign
sources in Vietnam such as officials in the ministry of health, defense, and for-
eign affairs and local officials. On the macro-level effectiveness, the study finds
that HA missions expand US influence, improve access, and support both mili-
tary and diplomatic relations with the host nations and other organizations.
While these results are encouraging, more systematic research is necessary to val-
idate these findings.
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Using a more general and quantitative approach, Major (2012) tried to create
a soft power measure by comparing the UN voting behavior of nations7 after
Theater Security Operations (TSC)8 with the policy preferences of the United
States. Via a unidimensional parametric scaling model, estimated via a Bayesian
algorithm, he creates a measure for the divergence between the preferred poli-
cies of the United States and the host nations which, in turn, is believed to
measure states’ “attraction” for policies favored by the United States (and thus
the latter’s “soft power”). He tested whether engagement led to a shift in the
ideal point of the host nation that is closer to the ideal point of the US policies.
His data, based on the (U)TSCMIS, the (UNCLASSIFIED) Theater Security
Cooperation Information System,9 include not only hospital ship visits but also
events such as International Cadet Program, Counterproliferation Awareness
Training, Military Transition Assistance, Asia–Pacific Military Medicine Confer-
ence or African Attache Roundtable. The results are generally positive. While
they only show a modest effect, it nonetheless seems that these engagements
“pay off” for the US military.
Micro-Level Influence
Datta (2009) finds a “statistically significant relationship between global atti-
tude toward” the United States and political outcomes in line with US
national interests. Most of the existing opinion research focuses on postdisas-
ter relief evaluations rather than humanitarian assistance. Positive results were
found in public opinion surveys conducted in Indonesia, Bangladesh, and
Pakistan in 2006 (Terror Free Tomorrow 2006) and in Sri Lanka in 2005 (Ra-
japaksa and Dundes 2006).10 While many people in these three large Muslim
nations oppose the US war on terror, they were nevertheless very grateful for
the disaster relief provided by the United States and even wished for an
increase in activities. The interviews revealed that after receiving aid, the pop-
ular opinion toward the United States has been clearly more favorable than
before. While the increase in positive attitudes after the Tsunami relief is
widely acknowledged, the influence of the earthquake relief in Pakistan in
2005 for example is more controversial. A study conducted by PEW (Wike
2012) on the impact of humanitarian aid on the image of the United States
finds only a modest increase at the national level, shortly followed by a
renewed decrease beginning in spring 2007. Wilder (2010) finds no positive
effect on attitudes at the national level. However, a study by Andrabi and Das
(2010) conducted four years postearthquake found differences between Paki-
stanis living in close proximity to the affected region and those living at a dis-
tance. Proximity to the fault line encouraged higher levels of trust. After
controlling for other factors, the two researchers attribute this to the greater
exposure to “Western humanitarian aid organizations” after the earthquake.
The results are thus mixed: While some are very promising, others offer a less
optimistic perspective.
7Other research is concerned with the impact of US foreign aid on UN voting behavior (see for example Wang
1999).
8TSC describes all US military efforts to build relationships, improve friends’ and allies’ capabilities, and provide the
United States with peacetime and contingency access to prevent future conflict through shaping of the environment.
9The TSCMIS database (1998–) captures the operations of each Unified Combatant Command (COCOM).
Because each command is responsible for entering the data, the reports vary greatly. Unfortunately, we have to
assume that many operations are missing, but these data present the best available collection up to date.
10Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka received US disaster response for the Tsunami in December 2004, Paki-
stan for the large earthquake in 2005.
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One example for the impact of humanitarian assistance is the US stability
operations in Afghanistan. Winning hearts and minds as part of the US coun-
terinsurgency strategy has largely been regarded as a failure and triggered
much criticism, in particular from the aid community (Williamson 2011). A
recent assessment found only minor short-term improvements after aid projects
and only little evidence for winning people over, away from the insurgency
(Chretien 2011). On the contrary, an earlier study found the Taliban’s own
hearts and minds campaign to be quite successful (Senlis Council 2006). Of
course, it is difficult to compare effects of aid in different situations such as
disaster relief and humanitarian assistance and whether aid was delivered in a
permissive or nonpermissive environment. Furthermore, the PEW study (Wike
2012) concludes that significant effects on public attitudes are more likely
when there already is “a reservoir of goodwill toward the United States.” In
countries with very negative attitudes, humanitarian assistance is less likely to
have an impact.
The Way Ahead
US ambitions for military humanitarian assistance are manifold. While the previ-
ous section focused on people’s attitudes and governmental relations, the
success of health-care, veterinary, and construction projects are important US
objectives for building relationships and trust, fostering goodwill and working
toward common goals. The success of US activities is relevant as it impacts the
level of soft power currencies. Long-lasting positive effects are likely to increase
the level of gratitude, admiration, and shared values, resulting in stronger soft
power influence. The following are possible approaches to develop measures of
effectiveness to be able to identify change. Based on these indicators, more com-
plex models can be created to establish a causal connection and assess soft
power capital.
1. Host nation health-care capacity building
a. Develop indicators to assess long-term improvement
b. Post-visit interviews to follow up on long-term success and sustain-
ability of projects
2. Military-to-military relations
a. Define improved relations and enhanced interoperability
b. Develop indicators to measure improved relations and interopera-
bility
3. Population and government and local officials
a. Develop indicators to measure diplomatic and political success
b. Post-visit interviews: Assess whether missions had an impact on
attitudes toward the United States, whether they resulted in grati-
tude, admiration, or shared values
c. Track newspaper coverage in the relevant regions and United
States and evaluate the framing, tone, and salience of certain
aspects
Host Nation Health-Care Capacity Building
While immediate treatments are more likely to positively affect the attitudes
toward the United States, capacity building offers long-term improvement for
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the health-care services and infrastructure of a country and is thus more likely to
result in lasting gratitude by the host nation government and generate soft
power in the form of political capital. In the most recent hospital ship missions,
an increasing number of activities have focused on capacity building rather than
immediate treatments. Capacity building cannot be simply accounted for with
measures of effort such as the number of surgeries. During CONTINUING
PROMISE 2011, for example, host nation medical practitioners were invited
aboard the USNS Comfort to receive training in assessing a baby’s health right
after birth and to learn how to react to breathing problems (Richardson 2011).
One way to evaluate the effectiveness rather than the effort would be to follow
up and ask whether the practitioners were able to put their learned skill to use
or even share their experience with other providers. Similarly, conducting a
hygiene promotion workshop in a rural community is just a first step. Only fol-
low-ups can monitor whether washing hands, for example, was continued after
the team has left. Possible follow-up partners include other USG agencies, rele-
vant persons from the host nation, UN agencies, and NGOs (Haims, Moore,
Green, and Clapp-Wincek 2011). For every activity, two different sets of indica-
tors should be developed and monitored. The first set of measures control for
the effort: the successful completion of the tasks. Several months later, the sec-
ond set of measures control for the effectiveness.
Post-mission interviews are also necessary to understand whether the mission
was successful in providing the people with what they need. An OECD (1999)
evaluation of development programs states that
interviews with a sample of the affected population should be a mandatory
part of any humanitarian assistance evaluation. (…) Even where time and the
situation permits, humanitarian agencies are often poor at consulting or
involving members of the affected population and beneficiaries of their assis-
tance. Consequently, there can often be considerable discrepancy between the
agency’s perception of its performance and the perceptions of the affected
population and beneficiaries. Experience shows that interviews with beneficia-
ries can be one of the richest sources of information in evaluations of human-
itarian assistance.
Delivering the right assistance will positively affect the level of gratitude, admi-
ration, and perception of shared values and thus provide more soft power capital.
Military-to-Military Relations
Another overall goal is to improve the relationships between militaries and to
enhance their interoperability. It is important to establish more specific goals
and guidelines. If the goal of improving relations can be met with an increase in
cooperation, one possible indicator is the number of Theater Security Coopera-
tion activities. The following graph shows the increase in TSC exercises between
the United States and countries visited by USNS Mercy (Figure 2).
Of course with these data alone, attribution is not possible, but many coun-
tries show a stark increase since 2006. All countries with the exception of Palau
and Papua New Guinea more than doubled their joint TSCs since 2003. The
often-mentioned host nation capacity for disaster relief is more difficult to
assess, and only a real crisis can put improvements to the test. In the meantime,
one possible measure is to define relevant indicators and quantify progress in
disaster preparedness and response mechanisms after future joint training ses-
sions. Examples include quantifying the level of readiness through metrics such
as the establishment of guidelines defining responsibilities, provisionary shelters,
clean water access, food supplies, and interaction procedures with third coun-
tries.
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Population and Government and Local Officials
The measurement of the soft power currencies gratitude, admiration, and shared
values requires various indicators. As mentioned previously, the challenges to
evaluate success include long-term ambition, intangible concepts such as trust
or improved relationships, as well as the problem of attributing change to a
particular activity. Possible indicators on a governmental level include bilateral
agreements and amendments (Ganapati, Kelman, and Koukis 2010), voting
behavior (Major 2012), ambassador activity, and exchange with the ministries of
health. As US ambassadors play important roles in the missions, an increase in
invitations to meetings and events by the host nation government could serve as
one indicator for closer relations. Similarly, lasting relationships can be assessed
by monitoring the exchange between US government agencies and the host
nations’ ministries of health following the close collaboration before and during
the missions. A recent project by the University of Texas (Matwiczak 2010)
released different metrics to assess the impact of public diplomacy. Some of
them could be modified and applied to military HA:
1. Relative change in the number of US policy-related informational
events directed toward foreign governments in a fiscal year (FY)
2. Relative change in number of government officials who participate in
government exchange programs in a FY from the previous FY
3. The number of statements (official statements, editorials, interviews, or
blogs) released by government officials in a FY that correctly character-
ize US military humanitarian assistance
4. Relative change in the number of elites who attend policy-related (mili-
tary humanitarian assistance) events from the number of elites who
attend similar policy-related (military humanitarian assistance) events
the previous FY
5. Relative change in number of press briefs on US military assistance
released by the embassy from the previous year
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6. Relative change in attendance at US-conducted policy briefings by
host-country “elites”
7. Relative change in “favorable” interviews of host-country elites about
US foreign policy
8. Relative change in the number of times a foreign government agrees
to assist in enforcing US preferred security issues with a third party
state, after a hospital ship visit
9. Relative change from previous year in exchanges between host nation
and US military for purposes of training, development, and informa-
tion sharing
10. The percentage of “man-on-the-street” interviews with favorable views
of US policy minus the percentage from the previous FY, divided by
the previous FY
The last question brings us to public opinion polls. While the PEW Global
Attitudes Project either does not include the relevant countries or time frame for
the USNS Comfort and USNS Mercy visits, the Latinobarometro11 offers an alter-
native. Between 1,000 and 1,200 interviews are conducted annually in Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, and
the Dominican Republic. Figures 3 and 4 compare the percentage of respondents
who viewed the United States favorably from 2005 to 2009.
The countries visited by CONTINUING PROMISE with the addition of Hon-
duras already started with a higher level of favorable opinion toward the United
States. Like the PEW study by Wike (2012) suggested, it is easier to influence
people who already start out with a less negative attitude. This initial goodwill
might make a further increase more likely. However, to make any assumptions
about the impact of US military HA on opinions, future research should control
for the respondents’ knowledge about the missions and whether they were per-
sonally affected. Post-visit interviews with both people who were affected (such as
patients and their families, medical personnel receiving training, officials of the
ministries of health) and those who only heard about the visits can help to
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FIG. 3. Countries Not Visited During CONTINUING PROMISE Missions
11The Latinobarometro is published annually since 1995. The public opinion surveys are conducted in 18 Latin
American countries and represent more than 400 million inhabitants. See: http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/
latinobarometro.jsp
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quantify the impact of the military humanitarian assistance on attitudes toward
the United States. It would be interesting to control for the possible differences
between aid received by involved NGOs versus military actors. Furthermore, And-
rabi and Das (2010) found proximity to aid services to be relevant for changes
in attitudes.
Another promising way to communicate US soft power efforts and to under-
stand attitudes is media coverage. Traditionally, breaking news, large number of
casualties, and saving the lives of innocents receive broad media coverage (Moel-
ler 2008). Hospital ship missions are not “news,” and they are not as exciting as
large-scale natural disasters and thus are less likely to make it to the front page
of a newspaper. Important aspects of media impact include the density of cover-
age, type of coverage (success stories, neutral descriptive), and framing of the
story. In the political discourse, the tone of a text may matter as much as the
substantive content. Numerous studies have analyzed the tone or sentiment of
text (Young and Soroka 2012). The framing of newspaper articles by highlight-
ing particular elements, repeating or avoiding certain aspects, and using a partic-
ular language can heavily impact people’s perceptions (Chong and Druckman
2007). The reader’s viewpoints are shaped by the media’s interpretation of
events, the explanation of problems, and the casting of moral judgments (Ent-
man 1993; Shah, Watts, Domke, and Fan 2002). Framing differs from agenda set-
ting because it focuses on the salience or weight assigned to certain aspects of
the topic, not salience of the topic itself (Scheufele 2000). Before journalists can
frame their stories, agenda setting determines the emphasis a certain topic will
receive. The impact of agenda setting was first discussed by Mccombs and Shaw
(1972). Their study found a strong correlation between prominence of a topic
in the media and the importance attributed to this topic by the audience.
One aspect of media coverage research should look at US sources. As part of
communicating the US goodwill, newspaper articles can offer an important con-
tribution to how missions are perceived. Although soft power depends on the
receiver, the sender can try to maximize the potential impact. Searching Lexis-
Nexis for hospital ship coverage in major English newspapers shows that neither
the New York Times nor Washington Post covered the topic. The New York Times fea-
tures a total of two articles on US relations with Latin and South America that
mention President Bush’s announcement of the first CONTINUING PROMISE
visit in 2007. The Washington Post featured five articles discussing Bush’s engage-
ment in the Western Hemisphere and one article discussing the US troop
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withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan in which the USNS Comforts 2011 visits
were mentioned in one sentence. The only other time since 2006 that a US hos-
pital ship received coverage was for the US disaster relief mission after the Haiti
earthquake in 2010, underlining the argument that disaster relief is more excit-
ing. This low coverage is surprising and raises questions about its perceived
importance in Washington.
The other aspect of media coverage is agenda setting and framing in foreign
newspapers. In other parts of the world, the most recent mission PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP 2012, for example, received more attention. The Chinese People’s
Daily writes on April 17, 2012, “the U.S. Navy is sending the USNS Mercy, one of
its two medical ships, on a goodwill mission to Southeast Asia next month, seek-
ing to build partnership with regional militaries. (….) The United States is focus-
ing its military resources to the Asia Pacific region in face of budget cuts, and
the Pentagon has made missions in this area a priority.” The very first sentence
focuses on the US collaboration with other militaries, rather than on providing
aid to the local population. The article does mention the free care but together
with the last sentence it highlights the increased US interest in military relations
in the region; thus, the article frames the mission more as a show of military
capability and less as a purely humanitarian endeavor. An article in the Indone-
sian Manila Bulletin from June 30 praised capabilities: “During the event, the
PP12 even managed to save the life of a man who only had less than 50 percent
chance of survival when he was given surgery aboard the hospital ship, USS
Mercy.” Another article in the Philippines Sun Star from July 4 reads, “Unity,
peace, friendship and sharing of culture were the lessons learned from the
14-week medical mission and more than 3 months of civic works in the two prov-
inces in the island of Samar.” Similar statements can be found for CONTIN-
UING PROMISE. An online newspaper in El Salvador interviewed one of the
patients quoting his gratitude for the attention he received and his praise for
the crew as “good people” (Elsalvador.com 2011). The same newspaper quotes
another patient, describing how the crew offers more than just medical services
but also “kindness and solidarity” (Zelaya 2011). A systematic examination of all
media sources including Twitter and blogs would allow creating a data set in
which the contents of missions’ coverage could be analyzed. There are many dif-
ferent types of content analyses. A more simple automated approach can look at
the frequency of relevant words such as “goodwill,” “help,” “friendship,” and
“gratitude,” while more complicated assessments can identify the use of different
frames.
Conclusion
My goal has been to position hospital ship missions in the context of soft power
and to suggest how future studies could assess the effectiveness of these missions.
Hospital ship visits are a good tool for signaling that the United States cares
about the well-being of people in need and attaches importance to the forging
of partnerships. Such operations have the power to influence both the popula-
tion and governments and offer soft power benefits to the United States in addi-
tion to providing medical aid to people in need. Captain Morgan (quoted in
Miles 2012), the commanding officer of PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 2012, summa-
rizes the value of the mission: “It demonstrates a commitment to the region, a
commitment to partnership-building, and a commitment to working together
toward common goals.” Given the increasing importance of global health, this is
a timely approach to advance cooperation and security. However, to date we do
not have the data to back such statements up with evidence. In theory, these vis-
its offer the possibility to increase US soft power capital with the help of the
currencies of gratitude, admiration and shared ideals, values, causes, and visions.
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I offered some suggestions as to how mission success could be evaluated more
systematically with more robust measures. In light of the tight budget for the
coming years, the future of such missions is uncertain when war- and peacetime
activities have to compete against each other (Freedberg 2012). A narrow per-
spective on naval tasks can argue that the Navy’s primary mission is to fight and
win wars (Carr 2010). More empirical research on the impact of military humani-
tarian assistance, as outlined in this paper, is necessary to convince policymakers
that, given today’s fiscal constraints, the limited national resources available are
or are not well spent on such missions.
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